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Proposals for a secure voting technology can involve new mechanisms or procedures designed to provide greater ballot
secrecy or verifiability. These mechanisms may be justified on the technical level, but researchers and voting officials must
also consider how voters will understand these technical details, and how understanding may affect interaction with the
voting systems. In the context of verifiable voting, there is an additional impetus for this consideration as voters are pro-
vided with an additional choice; whether or not to verify their ballot. It is possible that differences in voter understanding
of the voting technology or verification mechanism may drive differences in voter behaviour; particularly at the point of
verification. In the event that voter understanding partially explains voter decisions to verify their ballot, then variance in
voter understanding will lead to predictable differences in the way voters interact with the voting technology.
This paper describes an experiment designed to test voters’ understanding of the ‘split ballot’, a particular mechanism
at the heart of the secure voting system Preˆt a` Voter, used to provide both vote secrecy and voter verifiability. We used
a controlled laboratory experiment in which voter behaviour in the experiment is dependent on their understanding of
the secrecy mechanism for ballots. We found that a two-thirds majority of the participants expressed a confident com-
prehension of the secrecy of their ballot; indicating an appropriate level of understanding. Among the remaining third of
participants, most exhibited a behaviour indicating a comprehension of the security mechanism, but were less confident
in their understanding. A small number did not comprehend the system. We discuss the implications of this finding for
the deployment of such voting systems.
1. MOTIVATION
In response to problems with the counting and certifying of ballots in countries such as the United
States of America and Iran, academics and politicians have worked together to create and imple-
ment new voting technologies. Many of these technologies provide new mechanisms or proce-
dures that are designed to provide greater ballot security and opportunities for voters to verify
their ballot. While technically sophisticated, there can arise a disconnect between technical un-
derstandings of the threats and an understanding of how voters will accept and interact with the
technology. This disconnect is in some sense surprising as one motivation for technical work is
the lack of voter confidence in some current voting technologies.
Typical concerns of the technical variety include distinguishing between trusted and untrusted
agents [Rivest 2001], security and access to publicly posted ballot data, threats stemming from the
inclusion of proprietary software, and the lifetime of the encryption. While valid, these concerns
primarily consider threats in the context of the voting technology and only tangentially consider
the impact of voter understanding of the selected voting technology. It is likely that most voters
will avoid the technical deliberation and alternatively focus on the evaluation of non-technical
questions such as, “Can I use it?”, “Is my vote choice secret?” and “Will my vote count?” [Oost-
veen and den Besselaar 2004; Alvarez et al. 2009; Oostveen and den Besselaar 2009]. If voters
believe a new security or verification mechanism endangers ballot secrecy or accuracy, these be-
liefs may influence voter interaction with the technology; such as not voting or choosing not to
verify their vote.
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For instance, a loss of confidence in the butterfly ballot following the 2000 U.S. Presidential
election, is partially responsible for its being driven into oblivion in U.S. elections [Alvarez et al.
2008]. In India, election officials have sought to increase public confidence in the election process
by adopting electronic voting machines as a method to overcome “booth capturing” which is often
associated with paper ballots. If voters believe, rightly or wrongly, that a voting technology leaks
ballot information or that the technology provides an advantage to one political party, these voters
may move to block the use of the technology or under some regimes alter their voting behaviour.
In fact, research on American voters suggests individuals without voting experience may alter
their turnout decision based upon their perceptions of ballot secrecy [Gerber et al. 2011]. In light
of the role voter confidence can have on the voting process as a whole, we wish to evaluate voter
understanding of ballot secrecy and the subsequent impact on verifiable voting technologies.
2. VERIFIABLE VOTING
One basic requirement for a verifiable voting technology is to provide a voter with the ability
to check that his/her vote has been counted and verify that the election tally is correct. While
straightforward in the absence of a secret ballot, verifiable voting is more difficult to achieve
under a secret ballot. Despite the creation of several voting schemes which allow for verifiable
voting with a secret ballot, it is unclear how voters will response to these “sophisticated” voting
technologies. In particular, it is an open question how skeptical voters, those who do not un-
derstand the underlying security and secrecy mechanism(s), will react when given the choice to
verify a ballot. One possibility is skeptical voters may accept election official guarantees or verify
out of interest. Another possibility is those skeptical voters may simply refrain from verifying
their ballot, or worse exit the electoral process. This interaction between a voter’s understanding
of the voting technology’s security mechanisms and their decision to verify their ballot are at the
heart of any serious debate seeking to implement a verifiable voting technology.
In order to evaluate how voters may behave during a verifiable election, we evaluate the ratio-
nality of individual decisions to verify their ballot through the lens of their understanding of ballot
secrecy. The verifiable voting technology used in this context is a basic implementation of Preˆt
a` Voter [Ryan et al. 2009]. In the version considered here, Preˆt a` Voter represents a paper-based
voting system that allows voters to verify their ballot was properly recorded in the vote tally. Preˆt
a` Voter was chosen due to the simplicity of the mechanism that ensures the “receipt” or posted
information contains no information. The Preˆt a` Voter scheme requires that individuals who wish
to verify their ballot retain a portion of their ballot.
In our design, voters possessing strong beliefs over ballot secrecy during the election and verifi-
cation procedures will have an incentive to post their receipt to a public bulletin board.1 Whereas,
voters that possess significant doubts over either the ballot or verification system’s ability to main-
tain ballot secrecy will possess an incentive to refrain from posting their receipt. We suspect that
those participants with significant uncertainty over ballot secrecy may fluctuate between posting
and not posting their ballot.
3. PREˆT A` VOTER
We now give a high level overview of the classic Preˆt a` Voter system [Ryan et al. 2009; Chaum
et al. 2005; Ryan and Schneider 2006]. The ballot form consists of two columns with a perforation
vertically down the middle. The left hand side (LHS) lists the candidate names in a random order
and the candidate ordering varies from ballot to ballot. The voter can use the right hand side
(RHS) to mark her choice, and at the bottom of the RHS, there is an encrypted value. When it is
decrypted, the corresponding candidate ordering on the LHS can be retrieved. An example of the
ballot form is shown in Figure 1.
On the election day, each authenticated voter will be provided with such a ballot form, in
secret, for example in a sealed envelope. She takes it into a voting booth, and marks her choice
1The posting of the ballot to a public bulletin board is a step found in many variants of verifiable voting.
Fig. 1. A Preˆt a` Voter ballot form example
on the RHS against her preferred candidate. After that, she separates the ballot form into two
halves along the perforation and shreds the LHS which contains the candidate names. Then the
voter takes the remaining RHS to the election officials who will scan it into the election system.
Finally, the RHS will be returned to the voter, and she can take it home as her receipt.
After the election day, the election system will publish all the received votes onto a public
bulletin board, which may be understood as like a newspaper: once information is published, it
cannot be removed and it will be available to the public. The voter can now check whether her
receipt is correctly displayed on the bulletin board. If not, she can use her receipt as a proof of her
vote to challenge the election.
The key innovation of the Preˆt a` Voter system is that each voter is provided with a receipt.
The receipt contains the voter’s vote, but only in encrypted form. Hence it does not reveal how
the voter has voted. Meanwhile, thanks to the receipt, the voter does not need to trust the elec-
tion system to correctly include her vote, since the receipt can be used to enforce this through
verification.
4. METHODOLOGY
Whether voters understand the security of Preˆt a` Voter and how differences in understanding affect
voter interaction and behaviour is an open question. We hypothesize that voters will understand
the security mechanism of Preˆt a` Voter. We developed a simple game to test our hypothesis where
the actions of the participants will vary depending upon their understanding. In particular, in the
context of Preˆt a` Voter we are interested in evaluating whether voters understand the choice of
making public their receipt will not reveal their vote choice.
To test our hypothesis we slightly modified the Preˆt a` Voter protocol and designed a game
theoretic experiment where participant decisions to verify their ballot truthfully reveal their un-
derstanding of the security mechanism. Monetary rewards are used to motivate the subjects to
behave truthfully and to take actions that are in the subject’s perceived best interest. The game
works as follows: within a group of 12 subjects each subject casts a vote in a fictitious election.
When marking their choices, each subject will also need to select whether they wish to “post”
their receipt (anonymously) so that all subjects can see it. In this case, a receipt will be similar
to that shown in Figure 2. The incentives are structured such that if a subject chooses to post
her receipt, she will receive a reward of £1 (the amount is denoted as A). Otherwise, she will
receive nothing. After all subjects have cast their votes, all those who selected to post receipts
will have their receipts made public. Once the receipt is made public, each subject makes a guess
of every participant’s vote choice, whether or not that participant published her receipt. This sub-
ject will receive a reward of £.50 for each correct guess and zero otherwise. Moreover, she will
lose an amount of £.50 for every participant who correctly guesses her vote choice. Note that the
game design and reward values are chosen so that the experiment can separate those who believe
that the receipt divulges no information from those who believe that the receipt divulges some
information.
Fig. 2. A receipt example
The games economic incentives will induce subjects to self-reveal their understanding of the
security mechanism. As the receipt contains no information, the dominant strategy is for subjects
to post their ballot in each and every round. Given the receipt provides no information over vote
choice and there is a reward for posting ones ballots, voters who possess a full or high level of
understanding about the security mechanism will choose to post their ballot. However, a voter
who does not fully understand the security mechanism may be afraid that the publication of her
receipt will allow the other voters to guess her correct vote choice. Hence she may choose not to
publish her receipt.
5. SUBJECTS & LOCATION
A total of five experiments were run at the University of Surrey, UK. The dates of the experiments
were the 28th and 30th of June and the 1st of July, 2011; with two experiments on each of the
30th and 1st . Three experiments were conducted during lunchtime, with an additional afternoon
experiment on each of the 30th and 1st . Each experiment contained twelve subjects and lasted
about one and a half hours.
Subjects were recruited during the week prior to the experiment on the University of Surrey
campus via fliers and email. Prospective subjects were informed they would be paid between £10
and £20. While some university employees did express interest in participating, the majority of
responses to the call for subjects came from the student body.
The experiment location was the seminar room within the Department of Computing at the
University of Surrey. This location was chosen as it was both large enough to allow the instal-
lation of the voting equipment and was equipped with the proper technology necessary for the
experiment. A designated voting area was built within the seminar room containing a voter regis-
tration table, ballot box, and three voting booths. The voting booths were equipped with walls to
ensure privacy, a table for marking the ballot and a shredder for destroying the left-hand portion
of the ballot.
In addition to the designated voting area, a staging area was constructed where subjects read
the experiment instructions (reproduced in Appendix A), waited for their turn in the voting booth,
and participated in the game following voting. The staging area consisted of 12 rectangular tables
facing a whiteboard. These twelve tables were spaced such that no individual seated at one desk
could read a piece of paper on any other desk.
As subjects arrived they were assigned an individual table in the staging area. The subject was
handed a copy of the instructions and told that when all the subjects arrived the instructions would
be read aloud to the entire group.
Before the start of each experiment, the instructions were read aloud to the entire group.
Following the instructions, participants answered two questions to verify they understood the
purpose of the experiment, to assess understanding of the voting technology, and to verify each
participant understood how they would be compensated. Next the randomized ballot ordering
was explained and displayed to each participant. This demonstration consisted of displaying
multiple ballots simultaneously on an overhead projector and discussing how the placement of
a candidate’s name on any one ballot varied randomly between ballots. After all subjects made
a vote choice over all the ballots, individual payoffs for the round were averaged for those who
chose to post their ballot and those subjects who did not. The averages of these two groups were
then publicly posted for the subjects to observe. After the posting of the average payoffs, the next
round of voting started.
Principal steps in the experiment:
(1) Each subject receives a ballot and takes it into the polling booth;
(2) The subject fills in her vote and chooses whether to post her receipt;
(3) The subject separates the ballot into two halves, shreds its LHS and drops its RHS into
a ballot box;
(4) The receipts are made public for those who choose to post their receipts;
(5) Each subject attempts to identify the vote choice of every participant, including herself;
(6) Average payoffs for the posting group and the non-posting group are announced;
(7) Start a new round from Step 1 if the experiment is not finished.
6. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
In total there were 29 rounds of voting, with 5 rounds in the June 28th experiment and 6 rounds
in each subsequent experiment. Participant earnings ranged between £10 - 20. On average the
experiments took approximately 1.5 hours from start to finish.
Given the game design and the careful choice of payoffs, participants who fully understood
the security mechanism possessed an incentive to always post their ballot—as participants were
paid £1 for posting their ballot. However, participants possessing beliefs that viewing the right-
hand side of the ballot helps others guess their vote choice should be less likely or unwilling to
post their ballot. This behaviour was expected as a result of the game’s payoffs; participants were
penalized for each participant who correctly guessed their vote choice. Thus, we expected that
individuals who possessed significant doubts or a high degree of uncertainty over the secrecy of
the election technology should either refrain from posting or engage in a mixing strategy; switch
between posting and not posting.
Of the 348 votes cast, in 87% of the votes cast the voter chose to publicly post the right-
hand side of their ballot. The breakdown of posting by round is displayed in Table I. In each
of the six rounds, the majority of subjects chose to post their ballot. On average, there were
1 to 2 people who did not to post their ballot in any one round, out of a possible 12 people.
We anticipated that by the later rounds all participants would post their ballot. While Table I does
indicate that the proportion of participants who post their ballot is increasing over time, the size of
this statistic is insignificant.2 We conclude that even in the later rounds, round five or six, there is
one individual, on average, who does not post their ballot. This implies that even after observing
multiple occurrences of the voting process, posting of results, and ballot guessing game, there
remains some doubt over the amount of information contained in the right-hand side of the ballot.
Analyzing the posting behaviour between the five experiments reveals similar rates of non-
posting activity. In each of the five experiments, there was little variance in the total number of
non-posted ballots; between 7 and 10 ballots. While posting behaviour between rounds varied
slightly across experiments, there was remarkably little variance in the aggregate non-posting
behaviour at the experiment level. The consistency of the posting behaviour across the five exper-
2A simple logistic regression of round on subject posting behaviour reveals a positive but insignificant coefficient for the
variable round.
Table I. Ballot Posting by Round: All
Experiments
Did Not Post Posted
Round 1 13% 87%
Round 2 18% 82%
Round 3 15% 85%
Round 4 15% 85%
Round 5 7% 93%
Round 6 8% 92%
Table II. Posting behaviour by Participant Type
High Low
Certainty Certainty
High comprehension Always Post Usually Post
Low comprehension Never Post Usually not Post
iments lends credibility to the robustness of the result; i.e. more experiments are unlikely to yield
different results.
While in the aggregate the security mechanism appears fairly well understood, as 87% of
ballots were posted, we analyze individual decisions to evaluate two dimensions of participant
perceptions over the voting system. Table II separates participant understanding of the security
mechanism along two dimensions; comprehension and certainty. Participants may either compre-
hend the security mechanism or not, and these participants may possess either a high or low de-
gree of certainty over this assessment. The comprehension dimension approximates a participants
posting behaviour within any one round, while the certainty dimension helps explain participant
behaviour over multiple rounds. Participants with a high degree of comprehension and high level
of certainty will exhibit a behaviour consistent with always posting; this person will post in each
and every round. On the other-hand, participants with a low degree of comprehension and a high
level of certainty will never post their ballot. While individuals with a high degree of certainty
will play the same strategy across rounds, we expect that individuals with a low level of certainty
will mix between posting and not posting in an effort to reduce their exposure to the wrong strat-
egy. Thus, individuals with a low degree of certainty over their comprehension will be observed
mixing between the two posting behaviours; where high certainty types will always, or never,
post.
Analyzing the individual posting behaviour, the majority of subjects posted their ballot in ev-
ery single period. Out of a total 60 subjects, 62% (37 participants) posted their ballot at every
opportunity. These results indicate that a majority of participants possessed a high comprehen-
sion of the security mechanism and possessed a high degree of certainty over this assessment.
This data suggests that a majority of individuals took actions consistent with those of someone
who understands that the right-hand side ballot contained little or no information.
Of the 23 participants who did not post a ballot in at least one round, we find evidence of
only two subjects who made decisions consistent with an individual possessing a low level of
comprehension and a high level of certainty over this assessment. That is out of a total of 60
participants only two subjects never posted a ballot. This behaviour is consistent with a profile
that does not understand the security mechanisms provided by candidate order randomization.
The remaining 21 participants are classified as low certainty individuals, due to their posting
behaviour deviating in at least one round. Of the 21 participants classified within the low certainty
group, no individual posted in less than 50% of possible opportunities. These results indicate that
while roughly one-third of participants possessed some uncertainty over their comprehension of
the security mechanism, in no case was this assessment so low as to warrant that individual posting
in fewer than 50% of the rounds. These results indicate that even among uncertain participants
the overall level of understanding was fairly high.
3%
17%
18%
62%
Pos�ng	Behaviour	by	Subject
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50-67%
67-99%
Always
Fig. 3. Posting Behaviour by Subject
Despite the posting of average payoffs following each round, we did not observe wild swings
in behaviour between rounds as a result of the previous round’s outcome. Due to the low number
of participants who did not post their ballot, there were several incidents where the individual
who did not post their ballot received a higher average payoff than those who posted their ballot.
Despite reporting this result, we did not observe a large change in the posting behaviour during
subsequent round. Additionally, despite showing that on average individuals who posted their
ballots tended to receive higher payoffs, even in the sixth round we observed two participants
choosing not to post their ballot. We conclude that aggregate and outside information may have
an affect on individuals with higher levels of uncertainty, but these information flows may not
affect those who are either rightly or wrongly are certain of their understanding.
7. CONCLUSION
The majority of participants took actions consistent with those of a voter fully understanding
the security mechanism of Preˆt a` Voter. However, we did show that differences in understand-
ing can directly affect voter interaction with the voting technology. Approximately one-third of
participants took actions consistent with a voter expressing a high level of comprehension over
the security mechanism, but a corresponding low level of certainty over this assessment. Our
findings present initial evidence that voter interaction with a verifiable voting technology may
significantly vary by the individual voter’s understanding of the technology and their confidence
in this understanding. This finding raises the additional concern that, if implemented, a Preˆt a`
Voter style voting system may be vulnerable through indirect attacks via voter beliefs over the
secrecy of the voting process. While any such attack may be reduced via public information cam-
paigns and party support, additional research is needed to determine the size and significance of
these strategies.
Given the high educational level of the participants, detailed instructions, repeated nature of the
experiment, and financial incentives, we hypothesize that in a general election setting the level of
understanding will likely be lower than that which we observed. However, in a general election
it is also uncertain to what degree understanding of the security mechanism and will simply be
replaced with a voter’s notion of trust. Additional research is needed to better understand the
interaction of voter understanding of the election technology and voter trust in that technology.
While results indicate the transfer of information has a limited affect on individuals ”certain” in
their understanding of the security mechanism, it is necessary to further study this behaviour.
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A. VOTING INSTRUCTIONS
The following instructions were provided to the participants to read when they arrived at the
experiment, and were read out when they were all present, before the start of the experiment. The
questions at the end were used as a self-test for the participants to check that they understood the
instructions.
University of Surrey Voting Experiment Instructions
General. You are about to participate in a voting process experiment in which you will cast a
ballot for one of numerous alternatives. The purpose of the experiment is to gain insight into
your understanding of the voting technology and features of the ballot form. The instructions are
simple. You will be paid at the conclusion of the experiment. You have the right to withdraw from
the study at any time and all identifiable data and information will be confidential. This study
has received a favourable ethical opinion from the University of Surrey Ethics Committee. If you
have any complaints or concerns about any aspect of this experiment please contact Professor
Steve Schneider, s.schneider@surrey.ac.uk, 01483 689637.
Overview. You are about to participate in a voting experiment. Your compensation for this exper-
iment will depend upon the decisions you make. While some aspects of the voting process may
resemble those you have encountered in the past, there are some differences. We therefore ask
you to follow these instructions and ask any questions that may arise during the course of these
instructions. We kindly ask you to refrain from conversation during the experiment.
The voting procedure you will take part in tests a ballot form where the left-hand side of the ballot
contains a random ordering of candidate names. The experiment consists of several rounds and
the random candidate ordering is independent within and across rounds. That is in each round, the
ordering of the candidates on your ballot is unrelated to the ordering of candidates on the other
participants’ ballots both within and across all previous rounds.
Instructions to Participants.. At the beginning of the experiment you will be allocated £10. This
experiment will consistent of a set number of rounds. Each round will consist of two PHASES:
PHASE I
(1) First you will vote for a candidate. To vote for a candidate you will enter the voting booth and
place a mark in the appropriate box to the right of the candidates name.
(2) Second, you must choose whether to publicly post your ballot. To publicly post your ballot
mark the box that says “Post”. To decline to post your ballot mark the box that says “Don’t
Post”. In each round, if you post publicly post your ballot you will receive £1.00. If you do
not publicly post your ballot in a round, you will not receive the £1.00.
(3) Next, you will separate the ballot along the perforated edge. You will then shred the left-hand
side of the ballot; the portion containing the candidates’ names.
(4) Deposit the right-hand side of your ballot in the ballot box provided.
PHASE II
(1) Next you will select the vote choices of the other participants using the electronic handset
provided. If an individual chose to publicly post the right-hand side of their ballot, you will
view the right-hand portion of their ballot prior to selecting their vote choice. For individuals
who chose not to post the right-hand side of their ballot, you will be asked to select their vote
choice but will not view the right-hand side of the ballot.
(2) You will win £0.50 for each vote choice you correctly identify. You will lose £0.50 for each
individual who correctly identifies your vote choice.
The experimenters will keep track of payments and obtain the totals to pay participants. You will
learn your total earnings only after the completion of the experiment.
After each round some information will be publicly posted. The first piece of information is the
average payoff for the group that publicly posted their ballot. The second piece of information is
the average payoff for the group that did not publicly post the ballot.
Are there any questions? We kindly ask you to complete the following questions as these should
help you understand the instructions.
Questions
1). The purpose of this experiment is to study which item?
a). Who you will vote for in the next election.
b). Your social interaction in an election setting.
c). Your understanding of the voting technology and features of the ballot form.
2). What three activities comprise your compensation?
